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Introduction

The 1 960s brought the promise of a new era of social justice for all
Americans. Indeed, the overturning of official, state-sanctioned racial structures
was a watershed in national life. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the
earlier momentum of the civil rights period dissipated as the end of the postwar
economic expansion ushered in a crisis of American culture and polity. "Sym
bolic racism" emerged as a powerful political and ideological instrument to
buttress resistance to racial and ethnic equality. During the 1980s, a Reagan
administration antagonistic to the aspirations of minorities and the working
classes in general was able to impose an array of policies (and a discourse) on the
nation which polarized ethnic groups and classes even more rigidly. In Reaganism,
one sees the congruence and power of symbolic racism and class-targeted
economic policy, the capacity of elite forces to carry out economic restructuring
at the cost of minority equality. What the post-civil rights period has largely done
is to stack the American deck against African Americans and Hispanics.
The 1970s marked a watershed in the economy of the United States, the
passage from the "effortless growth" of the initial postwar period to a harsher
age. It was a decade which witnessed price escalation, sharp economic recession,
and culminated in the onset of stagflation. The decline of the much heralded
"American Standard of Living" was felt in many quarters and especially
throughout the lower middle and working classes. 1
At the core were deeply-rooted and apparently unsolvable structural problems
reflecting an altered American global position: the inability of major corpora
tions to raise productivity and profit levels and their loss of global and domestic
competitiveness; the demise of substantial numbers of industrial jobs to export
and automation strategies; instability in financial markets; and, above all, the end
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of dependable, stable growth. In an important work appearing at decade's end,
Paul Blumberg found "the chronic stagnation of living standards" begetting a
,,
"psychology of scarcity, limits and retrenchment 2
Economic decline severely undermined what had been deep public confi
dence in political institutions. Elected on a platform pledged to restore the public
trust, the Carter administration (1977-81) lacked the political skills, sense of
priorities, and outright capacity needed to reverse the deterioration. Moreover,
major Carter policies from 1978 on-social budget cutting, inflationary control
through recession and military buildup-were a repudiation of initial commit
ments to a more equitable society. This revealed the exhaustion of the possibilities
of liberal corporatism (and also prefigured the coming of Reaganism).3 In the
increasing hostility of business circles to various facets of the welfare state, in the
newly emergent neo-conservative trend with its opposition to the claims of
ethnic and sexual minorities, the face of the decade-to-come was visible. By
1980, the lack of a viable alternative economic strategy (or political coalition) set
the stage for the bold experimentation of the Reagan period.
Reaganism set the tone of political discourse in the 1980s and helped carry
oJ,lt a profound transformation in both public and private spheres. In retrospect,
it amounted to a grand and risky attempt to transcend the crisis of corporate
liberalism. The curious political coalition that put Ronald Reagan in the White
House-right wing western energy, agribusiness and fmancial entrepreneurs,
southern religious fundamentalists, traditional upper middle class Republicans,
and crucial numbers of disillusioned urban blue collar and lower white collar
workers-was largely held intact by Reagan' s fmn advocacy of high powered
economic growth, low inflation and national renewal.
There was an additional source of active bonding here: racism. The civil
rights movement had, among its great successes, succeeded in undermining the
ideological power of white supremacy. Biological racism and its accompanying
Jim Crow institutions had been largely discredited during the upsurge of the
1960s. Yet, racism was sustained as an American norm and continued to be
central to the way in which white Americans ordered the universe. In a huge,
disparate and deeply competitive nation, anti-black, anti-Hispanic sentiment
served as a force for unity and stability among the majority population, displacing
class conflicts into race and legitimizing the social structure.4 It, furthermore,
conferred some definite material and psychological benefits upon whites. In
brief, the civil rights revolution had failed to transform the cultural belief system
that held the humanity and culture of African and (in a somewhat different
degree) Hispanic Americans to be less than their own. 5
This is a crucial aspect of the social justice "dilemma" in the United States
today. Benjamin Ringer has argued that "America's response to and treatment
of its racial minorities have had a dual character . . . built into its structural and
historical origins."6 Because of deep institutional racial discrimination and the
resilience of racial/ethnic hierarchies, some minorities have been acutely vul
nerable to the functioning of marketplace capitalism; they have needed profound
governmental interventions to secure entre into the primary economic sector,
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and, once in, something approaching equal opportunity. What the new "sym
bolic racism" which emerged as the successor to the traditional Jim Crow racism
in the late 1960s did was to legitimize resistance to racial equality and equality
of opportunity and delegitimize state intervention for minority social justice.
Symbolic racism has been an ideology attuned to the needs of the post-civil
rights era. New "cultural" stereotypes have appeared to replace the more overt
biologically-determined ones. African Americans and Hispanics in the labor
market have been characterized as lacking the skills and motivation to perform
in a high skill economy. What reinforced the power of symbolic racism was its
incorporation of the dominant American ideology of individualism, which
explains social structure and wealth and poverty by reference to individual
character and talents'? A society where "social solidarity" 'is based upon
"separating those who are deserving from those who are not," seeks to blame and
,,
discredit the "undeserving. 8
The context presented here is that of an "open" system ready to reward the
capable and motivated. Symbolic racism uses the individualistic ethos to
attribute non-white poverty, unemployment and low occupational status to
personal failings. To explain why African Americans and Hispanics occupy a
grossly disproportionate percentage of jobs in the lower wage, lower promotion,
lower security secondary economic sector, why they often leave the labor market
in despair, etc., it offers the notion of "cultural" and "personality" dysfunctions.

Reaganism: The Congruence of Class Politics and Racism
Reaganism marked the culmination of years of white backlash to the civil
rights revolution. White counter-mobilization on a massive (and national) scale
had frrst found its political focus in the right wing populist presidential campaigns
of George Wallace. Wallace's success in exploiting the economic insecurities
and failed expectations as well as the racial animosities and fears of the lower
middle and working classes prompted Republican strategists to embrace white
southerners (and anti-black sentiment, in general) as the key to a "permanent"
lock on the White House.9 Reagan's decisive

1980 election victory capitalized

heavily on racially motivated voters to sweep the South, while winning substan
tial support among those northern white ethnics alienated from the pro-minority
stance of the national Democratic Party. The prolonged economic crisis had
accentuated the struggles between majority and minority citizens for jobs and
social services; meanwhile, increasing black political clout had made political
action an imperative for groups espousing a "defensive" white ethnicity.l0
In short, the presidential triumph of Ronald Reagan marked the ascendence
of the politics of race and resentment; it provided a fearful white majority with
a federal state committed to the racial status quo; it provided the New Right (and
its agenda of "social control" over racial majorities) a powerful place at the center
of policymaking.
The nature of Reagan's core political base, in addition to his own corporate
and ideological loyalties, meant certain business sectors (and the classes which
owned and managed them) were to

be the locomotive of economic expansion.
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Resources and initiatives were transferred from the public to private sector. The
scope of the federal regulatory mission was markedly reduced. To further capital
accumulation in favored sectors, state spending was shifted from social services
to the military, progressive taxation undermined, and an anti-trade union
environment sustained, aimed at exacting wage discipline and concessions from
the workforce. This amounted to a partial dismantling of the New Deal social
contract, in essence, "a coherent ideological attack on the principles that have
governed policy in this country for the last half-century."ll
A centerpiece of Reagan program strategy was the diminishing of the
welfare state. Here, a key thrust was the reduction/repeal of various public
entitlements and programs directed at aiding poor and working class Americans.
Only the "truly needy," as defined by the administration, would be helped. This
was, in effect, to be the Reagan solution to what O'Connor has called, "the main
domestic problem facing big capital"-the social wages built up since the New
Deal that constituted the American version of "Social Democracy."12 Such in
come maintenance programs were targets because they enlarged workers'
bargaining power and autonomy vis-a-vis capital. During the administration's
first year in office, it "made the severest cuts in social spending in our history ."13
It is significant for our ethnic/racial polarization thesis to note that ultimately
those programs with a broad base in the (disproportionately white) middle strata
such as social security and veterans benefits proved fairly resistant to cutting. In
contrast, those oriented to the (disproportionately black and Hispanic) poor and
working poor, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, vocational
education, public service employment, etc. were dramatically slashed. 14 What
Reagan policy makers exploited was the partial legitimacy of programs oriented
to the poor/working poor which (under the dominion of the "culture of indi
vidualism") bore the onus of being "handouts" to the "unworthy.',15
In retrospect, some of the Reagan administration's most ambitious initia
tives were aimed at revamping the post-New Deal social contract between citizen
and state. Thus, the objectives of the historic 1981 tax cut (and subsequent
weakening of the federal financial structure) were not simply to reward affluent
Republican voters and stimulate "supply side" mechanisms, but also to diminish
the capacity of the state to provide an effective social welfare system and take
new social policy initiatives. Citizens would be forced to radically reduce their
expectations of what services and the amount of social wages government could
reasonably provide. The goal, then (which was partly thwarted by Reagan
ineptitude and congressional resistance), was to delink economic rights from
citizens' traditional political rights in the United States. Indeed, the post-Reagan

$3 trillion federal debt and massive annual deficits have placed severe constraints
on restoration (or expansion) of future social welfare budgets.
The immediate consequences of the Reagan program were most apparent in
certain minority communities. For instance, for the estimated 1.6 million of four
million black families with children receiving AFDC monies, between 1974 and

1984, average payments per family declined one-third in real terms with the
steepest cuts in the Reagan years. Cutbacks in Pell grants to disadvantaged
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students, reductions in federal funds for public housing, and the elimination of
some federal jobs were felt disproportionately in the African American and
Hispanic communities. The fIrst generation of African American and Hispanic
mayors found themselves confronting enormous demands for services by
beleagered citizens, while federal cutbacks ravaged their budgets.
The neo-conservative assault on the welfare state carried an unstated (but
clearly implicit) message that the most unworthy programs were those most
crucial to minority needs. By arraying the prestige and power of the federal
government against special minority supports in education and employment, the
Reagan administration stigmatized them. Both the President and the U.S.
Attorney General pointedly referred to affIrmative action as "reverse discrimi
nation" and narrowed government suits to cases of clear "intent" Federal action
on behalf of equal opportunity declined precipitously. This, in turn, helped to
legitimize the type of racism which is most functional to privileged racial and
economic groups in present times; what Pettigrew and Martin refer to as the
"modem racial prejudice which is generally more subtle, indirect and ostensibly
non-racial," tends to be common in hiring and promotion processes. 16 In a time
of economic stagnation and deep anxiety for white workers (whose standard of
living is increasingly precarious), the clear absence of state sanction and moral
authority on behalf of equity not only intensifies normal "trench warfare"
between different groups for advantages, but encourages yet more explicit racist
attitudes.
If African Americans and Hispanics did succeed in achieving middle strata
status in unprecedented numbers during the 1960s, it was largely because of
direct federal bars on official discrimination and promotion of minority education
and employment 17 The end of favorable state intervention (in conjunction with
economic changes) has crippled that movement towards a minority social
structure resembling the majority one. When a government, by intention or by
product, assaults the position of the "popular classes" in the United States, it
inevitably wreaks the most havoc on subordinate ethnic and racial groups.
The Reagan administration was determined to serve the interests of its upper
middle and upper class core constituencies, exhalting the market mechanism and
eroding the capacity of the welfare state. The credo was to reward the financially
successful and those placed to be still more so. Thus, its definition of who and
what constituted legitimate clients for state services included individuals and
corporations, made or on-the-make, while excluding disadvantaged economic,
ethnic, or gender groups. Reagan's literal enunciation of a "colorblind" bias in
state policy left African Americans and Hispanics of all classes (but especially.
the working class and poor) subject to the vagaries of an increasingly harsh
market system.
The New Economic Order

Minority social justice has always been closely tied to the state of the labor
market. During the 1960s, the expansion of the technical-clerical-professional
areas of employment was vital to the breaking of traditional racial/ethnic
9

stereotypes and roles in the workplace and to the growth of black and Hispanic
middle classes. A historic restructuring of the U.S. labor market began in the
middle 1970s. This was in response to radically altered market, financial and
technological conditions and the loss of the "natural " American global dominance
of the early post-war era. In the Reagan period, because of business's
unchallengeable strength and its access to the levers of state power,restructuring
took the form of disinvestment and elimination of productive capacity, union
bashing, and changes in work organization, reducing the labor component in
production, outsourcing for goods in cheap labor areas abroad, and "paper
entrepreneurship. " IS

The most dramatic break was the monopoly sector's jettisoning of the much
lauded "social contract " it had negotiated with labor after World War Two. Even
in industries where powerful trade unions had once wielded great authority
(airlines, trucking, automobiles, electrical goods) concessionary contracts and
two-tier employment schemes became common. A transformed labor market
featured a core of full-time "regulators," surrounded by a growing periphery of
part-timers, temporaries, home and subcontracted workers (lacking medical
benefits, paid vacations and private pensions and bearing the costs of market
"dislocations "). 19
There has been a momentous change in the nature of job generation, itself.
During the quarter-century after 1950, the labor market generated a clear
majority of well-paying skilled positions; contemporary new jobs,however, are
centered in the lower to medium rungs of the service sector. Indeed, some eighty
five percent were found by one study to be in the lowest paid services.20 These
workers, along with the official jobless (over five percent in the "tight" labor
market of 1990) are those whom Emma Rothschild refers to when she remarks:
"The market-welfare state eludes tens of millions of Americans at the periphery
of the full employment economy. "21
This transformation was abetted by the Reaganist state which provided a
lucrative umbrella of deregulation and tax incentives for the historic leaders of
American manufacturing to pursue the "abandonment of production. " Market
logic and state policy made "conglomerate mania " and diversification into
financial services more profitable than product innovation and quality produc
tion. Deregulation of fmancial markets has resulted in an unprecedented wave of
hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts which left hugely indebted corporations
to pare off divisions and workers. Between 1979 and 1985,2.3 million industrial

jobs disappeared, precisely the stable, high wage employment which lay at the
cornerstone of blue collar aspirations for middle class lives.22
American labor markets have become more hostile to social mobility. A
major pole of Reagan-era job creation was the lower echelons of service
industries like fmance, legal services, sales, health, and insurance.23 Between 1983

and 1988,manufacturing provided exactly eight percent of net new jobs. So the
movement from manufacturing to services has impacted real income levels; by
1967, shrinking industries paid 41.5 percent more in annual wages than did the
expanding ones.24 As Katharine Newman so ably illustrates, downmobility has
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become a common phenomenon in large sections of the workforce. The restruc
tured American economy continues to generate jobs supporting upper middle
class lifestyles, but the bulk of new employment will be in retail services, office
work, cleaning, waiting and waitressing (2.5 million additional jobs are pro
jected for the restaurant fast food sector in 1986-2(00).25
The harshness of the new labor market is apparent in the stagnation of family
incomes over the last decade-even with the mobilization of more family (i.e.,
female) workers. In the decade that elapsed from 1975 to 1985, adjusted median
family income rose but a pittance, $27,421 to $27,735.26 The best the much
celebrated Reagan growth trend could do was return household incomes to early
1970s levels after a slight decline. Given the rapid rise in housing, medical, and
educational costs, however, stagnancy really meant a declining standard of
living and lessened future opportunities.
Previous growth eras (especially the two world wars and the 1950s to middle
1960s) carried an "equity dividend. " The force of economic expansion and labor
shortage buoyed lower income Americans (and disadvantaged minorities, in
particular) into more highly skilled, better paid jobs in the occupational structure.
Therein lay the basis for the dual theories of class and race "convergence " in the
United States. Yet, Reagan policies were directed at enhancing property-based
incomes at the cost of wages and thus succeeded in making the boom the vehicle
for the further enrichment of the rich. The nation is more acutely class polarized
than at any time since 1947; when Reagan left office, one-quarter of all American
households had a total net worth of less than $5,000, while the top one percent
owned thirty percent of total household wealth.27 The Reagan period was one of
both absolute and relative gain for the wealthiest twenty to forty percent of
American families (and especially, the top one to five percent), at the cost of the
stagnation and decline of the rest.28

The Victims or the Great Restructuring
In a society where there remains strong congruence between race/ethnicity
and class, to say the sacrifices of the Reagan "miracle " have been borne by the
poor and lower middle strata is to say that they have been unduly borne by
African American and Hispanics. Between 1980 and 1986, the earnings of full
time year-round African American workers fell from seventy-seven percent to
seventy-three percent that of whites; given the same family type, poverty was
higher for African Americans than whites. 29 In comparing high school gradu
ates, whites had incomes almost $4,000 higher than Hispanics; white high school
graduates earned $3,000 more than African Americans and $2,000 more than
Hispanics.30
These disparities are the result of both continuing racial discrimination in
the labor market and the new (and diminished) opportunity structure. Bonacich
makes the link here arguing that "race and ethnicity reflect a deeper reality
,,
namely class relations and dynamics. 31 Despite the continuing emergence of
African American and Hispanic middle classes, ethnic stratification has been
rigidified; a complex new division of labor organized along global lines had
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removed entry level positions in white and blue collar work and made a large
number of African American and Hispanic workers either dependent upon
substandard or superfluous jobs. The restructuring of central city economic
functions from manufacturing, warehousing, and transportation to information
processing and financial services played special havoc with opportunities for
young African Americans and Hispanics to gain stable, decent employment in
the unionized heavy industrial sector.32
The irony here-that after decades of exclusion, African Americans and
Hispanics would finally gain entry into the coveted primary industrial sector only
to have "deindustrialization" arrive-is a tragic one. This meant the savaging of
the stable, well-paid blue collar group (out of which the future minority middle
class would logically be recruited). Industrial restructuring precluded the "normal"
hiring of the second and third generations of these workers. In 1976, for example,
forty-six percent of African American workers, twenty to twenty-four years of
age, were employed as blue collar craft operatives; by 1984, this was reduced to
twenty percent33 Given such reduced possibilities of locating decent, stable
work, data showing that African American men spend substantially less of their
lives in the "official" workforce than whites, and often leave it in their prime
working years, is readily understandable.34
A cautionary note here. The importance of economic restructuring and
decay in maintaining minority subordination in labor marlcets is clear. But they

are interlinked with the response of political-economic elites to the questions of
allocating "burdens" in resolving the economic crisis and to the deep-seated (and
exploitable) racism of the majority population. Ultimately, these forces, together
with the intrinsic logic of a hierarchic system, made the variety of instruments
utilized by African Americans and Hispanics to create a society of real equality
ineffectual. In a recent article, the noted race relations scholar, Lewis Killian,
stressed just this point
The size of the piece of pie is not as critical in these times
as is the shrinking of the fraction of the pie left for the have
nots in a class-polarized society.35
Thus, instead of racial convergence, we fmd a continuing tendency for
majority and minority workers to start at different entry levels in the job market,
and have different pay and promotion proSpects.36 A significantly higher pro
portion of Hispanics and African Americans continue to work in the more
unstable and less lucrative "secondary" economic sector.37 Throughout the years
of economic downturn in the 1970s and early 1980s, the incomes of minority
families fell faster than those of whites, only to recover considerably more slowI y
during the subsequent 1980s expansion.38 In the generally prosperous year of
1986, median wages and salary earnings of African American workers were
sixty-three percent of white workers and Hispanics made slightly less than that
figure. It is also noteworthy that the relative incomes of African American and
Hispanic families have fallen since the late 1970s.39 African American unem
ployment has remained consistently at levels two to three times that of whites;
Hispanic joblessness has been intermediate between the two others. In 1987, for
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example, African American unemployment was at thirteen percent; Hispanic,
8.8 percent and white slightly over five percent. These figures help account for
African American and Hispanic poverty rates double to triple white rates.41
The weakening of the welfare state and growing labor market segmentation
structures are at the source of the crisis of African American and Hispanic youth.
Lacking specialized training, solid job networks, adequate transportation, access
to suburban labor markets, and standard language competency, minority high

school graduates and drop-outs must take the leavings of a bifurcated labor
market. There is, of course, "lingering" institutional discrimination to contend
with also.
The severity of the youth crisis is most revealing at the level of the family.
In general, "an economic disaster has afflicted America' s younger families," but
"young black and Hispanic families have suffered particularly severe earnings
and income loss."42 Young African American families saw their earnings decline
by one-half between 1973 and 1986; young Hispanic families, by one-third. The
steep fall in African American male incomes undermined their ability to sustain
families and resulted in a startling increase in young (largely single parent)
households in poverty.43
Young working class and poor white families have also suffered from recent
income losses and an acute lack of access to affordable housing. But ethnic
hierarchies and differential resources continue to favor them over minorities;
young whites at every occupational level earn more than their African American
and Hispanic counterparts. Young African American family income declined
from sixty percent of whites to forty-six percent between 1973 and 1986;
Hispanics from sixty-eight to sixty-two percent44 This may well be a long-term
trend; the rigidities of the nation' s economic and educational structures make
reversal of the pattern of growing youth inequality problematic, at least One
probable scenario of continuing racial (and gender) occupational segregation is
alluded to in a Bureau of Labor Statistics report: "The future labor force is
projected to be increasingly minority and female and they are destined for lower
occupations. "45

Conclusion
In a multiethnic nation like the United

States, social justice means the full

and equal access by minority groups to the whole range of societal opportunities
and resources. The contemporary American political-economy, has, however,
since the onset of economic crisis and political reaction in

the late 1960s, been

unfavorable to this. The Reagan administration, political beneficiary of the
widespread desire to halt minority movement towards equality ("symbolic
racism"), adopted social and economic policies which rewarded the affluent
classes and punished those minorities who were disproportionately lodged in the
poor and working classes. Welfare services needed to sustain minority com
munities have been drastically reduced. Meanwhile, the highly flawed growth of

the 1980s and a restructured labor market negated or froze many gains minorities

had made earlier. Poverty levels for African Americans and Hispanics have
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increased markedly. Over the period from 1973 to 1985, whites had (in crude
terms) barely held their own with an adjusted family income gain of 0.3 percent,
but Hispanic Americans lost 2.4 percent and African Americans, 8.7 percent46
This, of course, does not reveal an even starker truth: the United States during
these years had become a more unequal society on every level, between and
within ethnic groups and between classes and age groups.
Finally, there is the rather dubious legacy of Reaganism. Rather than the
powerful, competent, hegemonic power the Reagan experiment promised to
restore the United States to, there is a nation fitting quite weU"the classical model
of a failing economic power. "47 This is not the framework conducive to African
American and Hispanic progress; the mean conjunction of economic decay,
symbolic racism, and a series of interlocking structural mechanisms would seem
to augur a further deepening of racial inequities.
In the absence of an interracial-interethnic coalition seeking broad changes
in American society, greater polarization and fragmentation of our citizenry by
race, class and ethnicity seems likely. This may eventually undermine the
functioning of a rather fragile democracy.
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